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Abstract:  
The relevance of the study is determined by the necessity to improve criminal and legal antitakeover measures in the 
current context. The article deals with the comparative analysis of asset-grabbing as a wide-spread phenomenon existing all 
over the world and mainly typical for the CIS countries. The authors also analyze the experience of the European Union in 
counteracting illegal takeover of businesses. The analysis has shown that the phenomenon of ‘asset-grabbing’ is absent in 
the countries with a developed economies. Special state structures should be created to regulate the merger and acquisition 
transactions in the stock market. The present study is unique as it generalizes a broad legislative experience and shows 
significant discrepancy between legislation aimed at protecting the interests of shareholders in the countries with developed 
market economies and in the CIS countries. 
Keywords: asset-grabbing, European Union, counteraction to illegal takeover of a business.  
JEL Classification: K22; K23; K42.  
Introduction 
Asset-grabbing is understood as illicit takeover of a business against the will of its owners having a predominant 
position in this business, and (or) its top manager. The term ‘raider’ came from the United States of America, 
where raiders refer to the attacking party in the processes of mergers and acquisitions. In addition, there are 
terms such as ‘friendly/ unfriendly takeover’, ‘corporate raid’ and others, which originated in Europe and the 
United States of America (hereinafter referred to as the US) and are the result of the development of foreign 
legal and economic thought in this field.  
Asset-grabbing is an unlawfully obtained possibility to exercise managerial powers with respect to a legal 
entity, as well as the alienation of property and (or) property rights belonging to a legal entity in favor of the guilty 
or other persons, resulting from unlawfully obtained possibility of exercising managerial authority over such a 
legal entity.   
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The authors are of the opinion that this wording being a laconic one will simultaneously allow for the 
fullest coverage of the entire list of possible external manifestations of illegal seizures of legal entities, including 
both their physical (forcible) and legal takeover (establishment of formal control over them). 
Merger and acquisition processes are traditional methods of actions of the participants in the corporate 
sector of all developed countries at the present stage. However, the existing legal and normative framework for 
the regulation of these processes is constantly undergoing various changes.  
Asset-grabbing is a dynamically developing highly intellectual phenomenon. This is reflected in the fact 
that it is able to overcome the barriers that the legislator creates on the way to illegal seizure of firms, and also 
that it is stable, as evidenced by the creation of organized groups engaged in asset-grabbing professionally.  
It is possible to successfully counteract asset-grabbing in various ways, including by improving both 
corporate legislation and encouraging the law enforcement officials to implement their work in a qualitative way. 
As is known, scientific research of criminal legal phenomena and institutions is most effective when the 
study is conducted using a comparative legal method, especially when a legal phenomenon that has not been 
unambiguously evaluated by representatives of science and practice is being investigated (Pshipiy 2014). To 
develop the problems of counteracting hostile takeovers, it seems necessary to explore foreign experience in this 
field. 
The international level represented by the regulatory framework of the European Union and designed to 
guide the participating countries towards the creation of unified legislation in the matter of merger and acquisition 
is one of the highest levels for regulation of these processes. 
The European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU) was established on the basis of the Treaty of 
Rome that came into force on January 1, 1958 and represents the economic and political union of 27 European 
states. The main goal of forming a union of this kind was to create conditions for successful economic interaction 
of the participating countries, including through the formation of a single market for goods, works and services. 
In this sense, the processes of merger and acquisition in modern conditions are universal mechanisms for 
the development of the world trade turnover. The issue of legal regulation of companies’ activities, including the 
problems of legislative support for merger and acquisition processes, is given great attention in the EU activities. 
1. Research background 
Merger and acquisition processes are traditional methods of actions of the participants in the corporate 
sector of all developed countries at the present stage. However, the existing legal and normative framework for 
the regulation of these processes is constantly undergoing various changes.  
Asset-grabbing is a dynamically developing highly intellectual phenomenon. This is reflected in the fact 
that it is able to overcome the barriers that the legislator creates on the way to illegal seizure of firms, and also 
that it is stable, as evidenced by the creation of organized groups engaged in asset-grabbing professionally.  
It is possible to successfully counteract asset-grabbing in various ways, including by improving both 
corporate legislation and encouraging the law enforcement officials to implement their work in a qualitative way. 
As is known, scientific research of criminal legal phenomena and institutions is most effective when the 
study is conducted using a comparative legal method, especially when a legal phenomenon that has not been 
unambiguously evaluated by representatives of science and practice is being investigated (Pshipiy 2014). To 
develop the problems of counteracting hostile takeovers, it seems necessary to explore foreign experience in this 
field. 
The international level represented by the regulatory framework of the European Union and designed to 
guide the participating countries towards the creation of unified legislation in the matter of merger and acquisition 
is one of the highest levels for regulation of these processes. 
The European Union (hereinafter referred to as the EU) was established on the basis of the Treaty of 
Rome that came into force on January 1, 1958 and represents the economic and political union of 27 European 
states. The main goal of forming a union of this kind was to create conditions for successful economic interaction 
of the participating countries, including through the formation of a single market for goods, works and services. 
In this sense, the processes of merger and acquisition in modern conditions are universal mechanisms for 
the development of the world trade turnover. The issue of legal regulation of companies’ activities, including the 
problems of legislative support for merger and acquisition processes, is given great attention in the EU activities. 
A great deal of academic papers is dedicated to such phenomenon as a takeover (Laabs and Schiereck 
2010; Masulis et al. 2007; Mukherjee et al. 2004; Schneper and Guillen 2004; Walker and Hsu 2007; Williams et 
al. 2008; Coates 2003; Stout 2002; McCahery et al. 2003; Rose 2002; Faccio and Lang 2002; Berglöf and 
Burkart 2003; Winter 2002, Cain et al. 2017, Jandik et al. 2017, Wang and Lahr 2017 and others). 
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Different classifications based on the corresponding grounds are presented in them. When a takeover is 
referred to companies manufacturing similar goods or services, the main purpose is fulfilled by the growth in 
‘market share, synergy effect and scale effect’ – such takeover is defined as horizontal integration. Besides, 
there is the so-called vertical integration, when one company takes over its former (e.g., distributor or supplier), 
which helps a company take control over the whole production process (Puziak 2012, 62).  
In the above-mentioned case the acquiring company possesses a lot of financial resources for such an 
investment and it can be generally performed in a relatively short period of time. There may be cases when the 
attacking company continuously and consistently buys shares at a market price. In such situation the process of 
buying shares takes a considerable time. 
Takeovers may be hostile or friendly (Schwert 2000). They are distinguished by their purpose. The hostile 
takeover may become friendly upon mutual agreement during negotiations between top management of two 
companies. The objective of friendly takeovers is to receive profit from the synergy effect. The aim of hostile 
takeovers is the growth of competitiveness. In any case, takeovers result in restructuring of an acquired 
company, its current board and growth of profitability (Puziak 2012, 63).  
Many articles focus on hostile takeovers and defensive strategies of the resisting companies at totally 
different markets, for instance, in the USA (Puziak 2012), in the UK (Raj 2011; Gregory 2005), in Australia 
(Brown and Sarma 2007), in Russia (Bloom 2004), in Germany (Puziak 2012), in Spain (Fernandez and Baixauli 
2003), in Poland (Puziak 2012), in China (Zhi 2004), in Malaysia (Ali 2014), Romania (Şumandea-Simionescu 
2015) and others. The authors pay attention to the facts, which can influence specificity, frequency and 
possibility of hostile takeovers. They mention ‘organized entities with the majority of shares, and speak of banks 
in case of Germany, governments, referring to France and Austria or families as exemplified by Italy and Sweden 
in which case these entities have the control over public limited companies (Puziak 2012).  
Hostile takeovers were not considered a European way of leading business. But it was before the 1990s. 
Afterwards, these cases became more frequent, and legal basis had to be adjusted. In order to tackle hostile 
activity, the European Commission executed updated merger regulation and a Takeover Directive. The change 
of the situation leads to ‘continued evolution in the law’ (Beach 2016). The main worry of Europeans was not just 
takeovers within the EU, but also activities aiming at EU companies from abroad. An example is the Cadbury (the 
second largest confectionary brand in the world after Wrigley’s) takeover by Kraft, a US company, which 
asserted the United Kingdom – ‘a traditionally raider-friendly jurisdiction – making substantive changes to its 
takeover rules, including permitting boards to solicit alternative offers and placing stricter timetables on the 
offeror party’ (Beach 2016). Besides, in the European countries an important aspect in public limited companies 
is attributed to local governments or members of labor unions. Due to these facts hostile takeovers are rarer at 
these markets as compared to those in the USA or Britain (Puziak 2012).  
The process of a hostile takeover may be influenced by both internal and external factors. One of the 
main factors is dispersion of shares. Besides, internal factors include domination of single, private shareholder; 
poor management, undervaluation of share price, low level of debt and/or high level of liquid assets (Puziak 
2012, 61). The most significant external factors include (1) liberal government policy referring to processes of 
capital concentration; (2) the absence of cultural barriers as, for example, in countries loyal to family property 
(Puziak 2012, 61; Ferrarini 2009). External circumstances may be specific of certain countries. So, in China, 
many state-owned Chinese companies used to keep a certain number of non-tradable shares at hand to make 
secure an absolute regulating power over the company by the state (Ali 2014). The study of failed takeovers in a 
banking sector demonstrated that among the determinants leading to the failure are ‘deal specific characteristics, 
in particular the hostility of the bidder and the presence of multiple potential acquirers’ and the length of 
negotiations, ‘lengthier negotiations have a lower probability of success’ (Caiazza 2016). 
In the situation with a hostile takeover there are three potential outlines. In the first case, the attacked 
company defenses itself, but it is inefficient and the company is taken over. In the second case, the target and 
acquiring companies are merged. It takes place when the boards of two companies conclude to make an 
agreement related to a vision of another economic structure. In the last case, a target company takes up 
defensive activity and is successful to avoid hostile takeover (Puziak 2012). The board neutrality rule inherent to 
European legislation concerning takeovers was adopted to protect shareholder interests and aiming at 
harmonization across the EU, but in some cases it is criticized and scholars speak of ‘uncertain results’ after its 
implementation (Beach 2016; Humphery-Jenner 2012). We can even encounter the following conclusion: ‘The 
European Directive 2004/25/EC creates a disadvantage for European companies compared to their non-
European equivalents, primarily in regard to U.S. companies’ (Şumandea-Simionescu 2015). The result is 
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attempts of certain European countries to refer to a number of defensive activities. In Germany, for instance, 
Securities Acquisition and Takeover Act (20 December 2001, last amended by Art. 2 (46) of the Act of 22 
December 2011) allowed possible defensive procedures, supplying boards and executives with a number of 
defensive strategies (e.g., a White Knight tactics). 
The scientists analyze and systematize different strategies used by companies against hostile takeovers 
and their effect on the process of restructuring of a company, which is the purpose in this situation (Puziak 2012). 
These methods are divided into two main groups: preventive actions hindering potential buyers and 
counteractions performed after receiving takeover bid. In both instances the objective of the board is to persuade 
current shareholders to preserve status quo by making a company more attractive to its present shareholders or 
making a company less interesting to the attacking companies. The most frequently used defensive strategies 
include: clauses in the articles of association, present before takeover offer (staggered board, supermajority, fair 
price); counteractions initiated when the takeover offer is made: providing current shareholders’ support by 
sending particular requests or by arranging the meetings with the most important shareholders; lobbing, Pacman 
defense, Greenmail, restructuring of assets (Puziak 2012, 63).  
In recent years, techniques of defending against a hostile takeover have been transformed. It occurred 
due to changes in legal system, which made those strategies unproductive or even illegal regarding the new law. 
An example of such situation is poison pill strategy (Kahan 2002, Gleason 2009). This strategy is related to 
actions leading to high indebtedness when a company is under threat of unwanted takeover. Target debt 
issuance is mentioned to be used to prevent takeovers (Jandik et al. 2017). There are two competing 
approaches concerning the role of the poison pill strategy in corporate governance literature. One of them 
considers short-run effects after referring to poison pill tactics. This theory is frequently called the management 
entrenchment hypothesis. Another theory gives an explanation as to why shareholders benefit from the poison 
pill (Gleason 2009). Gompers et al. (2003) describe takeover defenses as weak corporate governance. The 
legislative arguments over dead hand poison pills are no more apparent than the policy arguments. In the USA, 
for example, ‘states’ legal codes are generally silent on dead hand provisions’, and ‘the legality is a matter of 
judicial interpretation’ (Gleason 2009, 371). 
In case of defense against a hostile takeover, there is another strategy including the intervention of ‘white 
knight’. In business, the target firm searches for white knight investors for a friendly takeover by buying shares 
(Beach 2016).  
Some authors write about such techniques as tender offer and proxy contest (or proxy fight) (Ali 2014). A 
tender offer is an offer to buy some or all of shareholders’ shares in a corporation. A proxy contest (or proxy fight) 
is a fight for the control of a firm in which the acquirer persuades existing shareholders to vote those 
shareholders’ shares so that the company will be easier to take over. 
Different scholars argue a matter pro and con relating the estimate of a hostile takeover (Billett 2007; Jo 
2009; Charles 2008; Fraser 2009). Some of them consider this situation useful, a kind of ‘an effective measure of 
external inspection’ (Ali 2014, 559). Additionally, some authors believe that a hostile takeover is totally arbitrage 
activity. They demonstrate that it may not only influence internal and external shareholders, but also give impact 
to management, employees and even customers both in a positive and a negative way (Ali 2014, 559). 
The study of the vast academic literature on the main issue has demonstrated the lack of publications 
dealing with the comparative analysis of legislative base related to the phenomenon of takeovers in countries 
with the developed economy and the CIS countries. Hence, the uniqueness of the present study generalizing a 
broad legislative experience and showing significant discrepancy between legislation aimed at protecting the 
interests of shareholders in these countries. In the second half of the 20th century major changes have been 
made to the national laws regulating the activities of companies in almost all member countries of the EU. The 
desire to create a single economic space, the globalization of production and capital is called by numerous 
experts the reason for this modification. 
2. Results and discussion 
It should be noted that the European Union carries out its activities mainly on the basis of constituent treaties 
concluded with its member states. In accordance with them, the EU carries out a set of measures to coordinate 
national legislations of member states concerning the regulation of companies’ activities. At the same time, the 
EU, taking into account the different features of the legal systems of the member states, leaves solutions to a 
number of issues on regulating the merger and acquisition processes at the discretion of the national laws of the 
participating countries. 
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The essential role in the formation of a single legal field is given to the directives of the EU Council and 
interstate negotiations. Fourteen major directives form the so-called EU Company Law Harmonization Program. 
The First directive on the company law was approved by the European Council on March 9, 1968 
(68/151/EEC). This directive established an exhaustive list of existing grounds and the strict procedure and 
conditions for recognizing the registration of the company as invalid. 
The Second Company Law Directive of December 13, 1976 (77/91/EEC) regulated the procedure for 
increasing and decreasing the authorized capital, the procedure for accessing information on corporate capital 
and so on. 
The Third Directive of October 9, 1978 (78/855/EEC) and the Sixth Directive of December 17, 1982 
(82/891 EEC) deal with the structural reorganization of public limited liability companies. The Third Directive 
establishes the basic principle of companies’ mergers, according to which the merger of the company is made 
without its liquidation. The directive provides for two forms of mergers: ‘division by acquisition’, which means the 
transfer of assets to an already existing company, and ‘division by formation of new companies’, where assets 
are transferred to a newly formed company. It is noteworthy that the Third Directive obliges the member 
countries, which previously were not familiar with the institution of merger, to introduce it into their national acts 
(Article 2 of the Directive). In addition, the Third Directive contains a number of provisions aimed specifically at 
protecting the rights of shareholders. Thus, for example, it establishes that the decision to merge is taken by the 
General Meeting of Shareholders (Article 7), prior to the adoption of a decision by the meeting a merger 
agreement shall be made, etc. Legislation of the member countries that have ratified this Directive should 
provide for an adequate system for protecting the interests of creditors of merging companies concerning 
obligations to them that arose before the publication of merger and whose validity has not yet expired by the time 
of this publication. 
Special attention on the part of the European Union is paid to preventing violations of the rights of 
company members during the merger. Thus, legislative consolidation of the regulations for the protection of the 
rights of employees of each of the merging companies is directly stipulated in the Council Directive of February 
14, 1977 (77/187/EEC), and in the Council Directive of 12 March 2001 (2001/23/EC). 
The EU Merger Directive of 1982was followed by the Division Directive (Sixth). Its requirements, like the 
requirements of the Third Directive, apply only to joint-stock companies and are aimed at harmonizing the 
process of dividing companies that are under the jurisdiction of one state, that is, ‘national divisions’. At the same 
time, this Directive does not oblige the states, where such a procedure of division is not envisaged, to introduce 
this institution (Article 1). 
The Fourth Directive of July 25, 1978 (78/660/EEC), the Seventh Directive of June 13, 1983 
(83/349/EEC), and the Eighth Directive of April 10, 1984 (84/253/EEC) deal primarily with addressing the issues 
of the rules for compiling and publishing financial information of companies. 
The provisions concerning the regulation of the procedure for handling financial statements of the Fourth 
and Seventh Directives are reflected and clarified in the Eleventh Council Directive (89/666/EEC), adopted on 
December 22, 1989, with a special procedure for the provision of information of this kind by branches and 
representative offices of foreign companies. 
In addition, it is required to mention the Directive 2005/56/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of October 26, 2005. Paragraph (1) of the Directive stipulates that the co-operation and unification of 
economic societies, based on pooling of capitals from different Member States is necessary. At the same time, 
this Directive defines rather clearly business companies for which the merger guidelines can apply, and clarifies 
what is specifically understood under the ‘cross-border merger’, as well as the order, conditions of control and 
consequences of the conducted merger. 
Thus, cross-border mergers imply the mergers of economic societies, united on the basis of pooling of 
capitals, established in accordance with the legislation of any member state and having their legal address, their 
central administration or their parent enterprise, provided not less than two of them are subject to the legislation 
of different member states. 
And finally, the Directive 2004/25/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of April 21, 2004, the 
so-called Thirteenth Directive, regulating the takeover bids, and Council Regulation 139/2004 of 20 January 2004 
on the control of the concentration between undertakings (the EU Merger Regulation, the latter modernized the 
Council Regulation 4064/89, which regulated these issues previously). The development and harmonization of 
these two instruments in the European Union bodies have been carried out for many years, and they, in fact, 
were the best synthesized result of a huge number of regulations issued by many countries for a long time. It is 
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important to note that the legislative acts that are adopted in individual countries constituting the EU must 
necessarily be harmonized with the regulatory and legal acts of the EU itself. 
The Directive 2004/25/EC establishes general principles and requirements that should be taken into 
account by the participating states in their company laws on with regard to the systems of national law and 
cultural characteristics. Considerable attention is paid to the formation and use of protection mechanisms in the 
course of companies’ acquisition. The following rules are of fundamental importance: the board neutrality rule, 
article 9, the breakthrough rule, article 11, the optionality and the reservation of reciprocity clause. These 
provisions are aimed at limiting the use of various ‘protective measures’ that companies can apply as a way of 
repelling unfriendly takeovers (‘takeover protection’). Moreover, the Directive contains a number of provisions 
with respect to minority shareholders, which include the Equal Treatment Principle, the Equitable Price Principle. 
However, the provisions of the Directive are mainly dispositive, which allows the national legislator to deviate 
from its text. Thus, the implementation and application of the Directive remain entirely at the discretion of the 
State. 
In addition, the Directive 2004/25/EC provides six general principles that should be applied in the 
procedure of acquisition: 
§ the same rules shall apply to all holders of securities of the same class of an offeree company. If a 
person acquires control of a company, other holders of securities must be protected; 
§ the holders of the securities of an offeree company must have sufficient time and information to enable 
them to reach a properly informed decision on the bid; 
§ the board of an offeree company must act in the interests of the company as a whole and must not 
deny the holders of securities the opportunity to decide on the merits of the bid;  
§ false markets must not be created in the securities of the offeree company, of the offeror company or 
of any other company concerned by the bid resulting in artificial the rise or fall of the prices of the 
securities becomes and distorting the normal functioning of the markets;  
§ an offeror must announce a bid only after ensuring that he/she can fulfil in full any cash consideration, 
if such is offered, and after taking all reasonable measures to secure the implementation of any other 
type of consideration; 
§ an offeree company must not be hindered in the conduct of its affairs for longer than is reasonable by 
a bid for its securities (Popova and Popov, 2008). 
However, perhaps the main objective pursued by the above Directive was to improve national legislation 
in the field of mergers and acquisitions and eliminate obstacles in the legislation of individual countries in the field 
of corporate regulation. Since each state in Europe is endowed with its national legislation establishing the 
procedure for the implementation of companies’ merger and acquisition, it is important to foresee the possibility 
of liability for violations of its norms in cases of an unfriendly acquisition. In the member countries of the 
European Union, a two-tier regulatory system has been developed: all merger and acquisition transactions are 
considered by a special Merger Regulation Commission within the European Union, along with local 
antimonopoly bodies. 
The United Kingdom is one of the member countries of the European Union. As a member of the EU, the 
UK regulates merger and acquisition issues under the 2006 Regulations on the EU Directive on Takeover Bids of 
2004 (Interim Implementation). As for national legislation, the UK is a unique example of self-regulation of the 
merger and acquisition market. It is interesting that in this country there is still no single normative legal act 
possessing the legal force of law and covering all issues related to the reorganization of legal entities.  
The British Companies Act 2006 is the main document of the United Kingdom governing corporate 
relations. The provisions of this law introduced significant changes to many of the previously existing aspects of 
corporate law. The Companies Act of 2006 (the most voluminous, by the way, a document in the British 
legislative history) changed a number of provisions of the Companies Act 1985, but in essence it, being similar to 
its normative predecessor, gives definitions of public and private companies. It is interesting that there was an 
even earlier Companies Act of 1948, which was so significantly and repeatedly amended and supplemented (in 
particular, in 1967, 1976, 1980, 1981), that its use in practice became rather difficult. Whereas the adoption of 
the new Companies Law in 1985 pursued its main goal of formal streamlining of the legal material without 
making any significant amendments to its content, in the Companies Act 2006, amendments and innovations 
appear in a rather large volume. In particular, the provisions on the contents of the memorandum of association 
are substantially changed, a number of amendments are introduced relating to company’s registration which are 
specifically aimed at simplifying the registration process, changes are made to take measures to store 
information about the company, it is made possible to provide various kinds of notifications via e-mail or through 
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the website and so on. Despite the fact that the Act obtained the royal sanction and was officially published in 
2006, only a few of its provisions entered into force in that year. This is explained by the fact that this document 
was put into effect step by step. Thus, on October 1, 2009, the last aspects of the Companies Act 2006 came 
into force (as the final stage of the introduction of the Act), according to which, for example, stricter rules are 
applied when registering the chosen company name. In general, the Companies Act 2006 contains about 700 
pages, includes 1300 articles and 16 schedules. 
Along with the aforementioned normative legal act, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers (CCTM, 
2016) is an important document of the UK devoted to the reorganization of businesses. For the first time the 
Code was published in 1968 and was repeatedly changed subsequently. The provisions of the Code did not 
have the force of law until the implementation of the 2006 EU Merger Directive in the UK. After that, the City 
Code acquired the status of a normative legal act. All UK companies follow its norms, as soon as the company 
acquisition situation arises and if this situation meets the criteria provided for in the Code. The British 
government formally recognized the power of the Code in the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000. The 
Code enshrines a number of limitations on the powers of the company’s directors in the matter of anti-takeover, 
while assigning a decisive role in accepting the proposal to shareholders, and also singles out a friendly 
takeover, according to which the takeover bid is transferred at first to the board of directors of the offeree 
company, and an unfriendly takeover, when such a bid is not directly sent to the board of directors. 
The most principled provisions of this Code were borrowed by national legislators of many European 
countries. 
In Britain direct control over the activity of the merger and acquisition market is carried out by the Panel 
on Takeovers and Merges (Takeover Panel), which uses the City Code f on Takeovers and Mergers in its 
activities. The Takeover Panel was established in 1968 and has always been an informal body. It consists of the 
representatives of the Central Bank of England, the London Currency Exchange, as well as leading financial 
institutions of the country. The Executive Board is the main body of the Panel. The Executive Board is chaired by 
the General Director (as a rule, the director of a large investment bank), who has been the Panel General 
Director for two years. The Panel has the right to make comments to violators of the City Code provisions, apply 
subsequently to the leadership of trade unions with the requirement to bring the violators to disciplinary 
responsibility, impose sanctions on their own behalf, demand compensation, initiate cases against violators of 
the City Code in the courts of England, etc. Working on an ongoing basis, the Panel assesses the controversial 
issues arising in the course of takeover, and they are respectfully accepted by the parties to the dispute. 
In addition to the above-mentioned documents, merger and acquisition processes are regulated in the 
United Kingdom by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (FSMA) and Criminal Justice Act 1993 (the 
provisions relating to insider dealing). The regulator of the UK stock market – the Financial Services Authority 
(FSA) – issued the Listing Rules, the Prospectus Rules, and the Disclosure and Transparency Rules. 
Additionally, the British and European competition law applies. In particular, the government Office of Fair 
Trading plays an important role in regulating corporate interests among the companies of the United Kingdom, 
which, in essence, is a regulator of consumer markets and a body for the enforcement of competition protection. 
The activities of the Office are based on The UK Competition Act 1998, which directly establishes the procedure 
for combating unfair competition, and, interestingly, amending UK legislation in the field of consumer markets as 
one of its functions.  
Actions defined in Russian law as asset grabbing do not apply to those in England. Any departure from 
the accepted practice of business or law is considered a fraud. 
The UK Fraud Act of 2006 established that fraud is a generic concept of all types of deception connected 
with obtaining any benefit or associated with causing damage. Three independent actions that constitute a 
criminal offense are stipulated as a fraud: they include fraud committed by: 
(b) making false statements; 
(b) illegal non-disclosing of information; 
(b) using own official position (LAW COM No 276, 2002).  
Obviously, in this case, both in Russian and in English criminal law, deception is recognized as a 
constitutive sign of fraud. 
In order to establish deception, there are a number of terms that differ slightly in their semantic content. 
Thus, a person is found guilty of committing fraud by making false statements in the event that he/she: 
(a) dishonestly makes a false statement; 
(b) intends, with the help of this false statement: (i) to obtain benefit for himself/herself or for another 
person, or (ii) to incur losses to another person or subject another person to the risk of losses. 
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A person is convicted of fraud by unlawful non-disclosure of information in the event that he/she: 
(a) unlawfully does not disclose information to another person, 
(b) does it dishonorably, 
(c) intends, with the help of this: (i) to obtain benefits for himself/herself or for another person, or (ii) to 
incur losses to another person or subject another person to the risk of losses. 
A person (D) is convicted of committing fraud by using his/her official position in case he/she: 
(a) occupies an official position in accordance with which he/she must act with caution or refrain from 
acting contrary to the financial interests of the other person (P), 
(b) dishonestly or secretly uses his/her official position; 
(c) intends, with the use of his/her official position: (i) to obtain benefit for himself/herself or for another 
person, or (ii) to incur losses to another person or subject another person to the risk of losses. 
Among the European countries that are distinguished by a relatively well-developed regulatory and legal 
framework regulating mergers and acquisitions are Sweden (Companies Act 1977), Germany (Joint-Stock 
Companies Act and Takeover Act 1991, Securities Law of September 6, 1965), Belgium (Royal Decree of 8 
November 1989 on public takeover bids and the change of control in companies), the Netherlands (Dutch Civil 
Code) and others. 
In the Western markets, friendly takeover first of all is understood as a process when the buyer submits a 
proxy statement to the authorized body (the US Securities and Exchange Commission, the UK Takeover Panel); 
after approval by this body this statement is sent to shareholders who at the general meeting of shareholders 
either approve or disapprove this transaction. 
A single approach to the definition of the essence of unfriendly takeover is absent in the EU countries. 
Unfriendly takeover is understood as primarily sending letters containing the buyer’s desire to purchase the 
company’s shares directly to the shareholders (Begaeva 2010). Thus, Jan Steinbacher (2007) defines a hostile 
takeover as ‘the acquisition of a target company whose management does not agree with this potential 
transaction.’ 
A whole set of measures has been worked out as a very effective mechanism to counter unfriendly 
takeover abroad that hamper their implementation (Arutyunova 2007). The essence of these measures is to 
make the object of attack less attractive. The arsenal of these methods is very broad, but in general, all these 
means can be characterized as the creation of additional encumbrances of the company’s property, such as 
liens, loans, etc. (Mikryukov 2012), as well as guarantees for the management of companies in the form of 
significant compensation in the event of a change of the firm owner (Zaichenko and Kotkova 2010). 
This example demonstrates that, despite effective protection of business and property by the state, 
private capital takes independent measures to protect itself, not trusting anyone. We regarded the opposite 
situation as a condition for the emergence of asset-grabbing in Russia. Only relatively recently in our country 
complexes of measures for antitakeover self-protection of legal entities from seizures have begun to develop 
(Smirnov 2013; Zinkovsky 2011). 
3. Criminal laws 
Having studied the criminal legislation of such economically developed countries as Australia, Austria, Great 
Britain, Germany, Denmark, Israel, Spain, China, Poland, USA, France, Switzerland, Sweden, South Korea, 
Japan, the authors have not revealed any norms on combating illegal takeovers of legal entities, which indicates 
that this phenomenon is not criminalized abroad. The most obvious explanation for this is that asset-grabbing is 
absent in foreign countries. 
In the process of studying the criminal legislation of these countries, the authors established a number of 
norms that represent a certain interest. It seems that they quite successfully perform the function of 
counteracting certain phenomena that can contribute to asset-grabbing. 
It should be noted that these norms were created not as a means of combating asset-grabbing, but for 
criminal-legal counteraction to various violations of corporate legislation, which, according to the legislator, had 
sufficiently high social danger to be criminalized. 
Next, we will dwell on a separate review of the antitakeover legislation of various countries. 
Thus, the Commercial Code of France contains a complex of criminal legal norms that protect corporate 
relations and provide for penalties for offenses against the management order in all organizational and legal 
forms of legal entities existing in France. 
They are responsible for the following types of crimes: 
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(1) Articles L. 241.3 (in partnerships with limited liability) and L. 242-6 (in joint-stock partnerships) provide 
for criminal liability for the submission of annual accounting reports that do not reflect the exact 
financial situation to the participants of a legal entity, as well as for the unfair use of managerial 
powers and the right to vote. The punishment is very severe – up to five years in prison and a fine of 
375 thousand euros. 
(2) Articles L. 241.5 and L. 242.10 (each for the appropriate organizational and legal form of a legal entity) 
punish managers who did not convene a general meeting of participants within six months after the 
end of the financial year by imprisonment for up to six months and a fine of 9 thousand euros. 
(3) Impeding the participation of a shareholder in a general meeting of shareholders, obtaining benefits or 
their promise for voting in a certain way or not participating in voting (in other words, bribing 
shareholders) is punishable under art. L. 242.9 in the form of imprisonment for up to two years and a 
fine of up to 9 thousand euros. 
(4) Failure to enter any decision of the meeting in the minutes, in accordance with Art. L. 242-15, is liable 
to punishment in the form of a fine of 3.75 thousand euros. 
(5) Unlawful issue of shares and illegal trade in shares (including up to payment of 1/4 of the authorized 
capital) is punishable by imprisonment for up to one year and a fine of up to 9 thousand euros. Earlier, 
there was article L. 242.16, which punished for a wrong vote count with a fine of 3.75 thousand euros, 
but it was canceled by Ordinance on August 1, 2003 (Fedorov 2010). 
It is worth noting that the criminal liability for these crimes occurs regardless of the purpose of their 
commission, in particular without reference to the possibility of seizing control of a legal entity by committing 
these crimes. 
The Criminal Code of Spain provides for the responsibility for a number of acts against the procedure of 
legal entities’ management. Thus, the following actors are subject to criminal liability: 
(1) the actual or legal manager of an association that had been or is being established, forging annual 
and other documents which must reflect the legal or economic situation of the organization, in such a 
way that it may cause economic harm to the association itself, its members or third parties (Article 
290) ; 
(2) someone who, using own dominant position in the governing body of a company that had been or is 
being established, will take an unlawful decision for the benefit of himself or a third person to the 
detriment of other members of the association and will not return profits (Article 291); 
(3) a person who will take a damaging decision or use it for himself or for third parties to the detriment of 
the association or its member, which decision was fictitiously taken using the signed blank form, 
illegally appropriating the voting right not belonging to him, illegally denying the voting rights of 
persons having it by law, or by any other method or similar method (Article 292); 
(4) the actual or legal head of any association that had been or is being established who without legal 
grounds will refuse or prevent a member of the association from exercising the right to information, 
participation in the management or control over the activities of the association or the right to 
preferential signing of agreements recognized in the current legislation (Article 293) 
(5) the actual or legal head of any association that had been or is being established who, for his own 
benefit or benefit of third parties, exceeding its official functions, will fraudulently dispose of the assets 
of the association or enter into obligations through association, directly causing significant economic 
damage to its members, treasurers, account co-owners or owners of property, securities or money, 
which he disposed of (Article 295) (CCS, 2013). 
Article 258 of the Spanish Criminal Code is of particular interest, according to it, a person guilty of a 
criminal offense who, after committing it for the purpose of avoiding the performance of civil liability resulting from 
this act, will execute acts by order or take upon himself obligations that reduce his property, becoming 
completely or partially insolvent (CCS, 2013). 
In this situation, the above does not refer to the legalization of property obtained by criminal means, since 
the goals of giving a legitimate form to owning, using and disposing of it are not pursued. 
However, in the course of the asset grabbing, sooner or later the fact of illegality of the origin of the 
property obtained as a result of committing this takeover will become evident, accordingly, in order to preserve it 
in one form or another, its alienation must be effected so that punishment cannot be drawn upon it. 
On the one hand, the property obtained as a result of asset grabbing passes through the chain from one 
one-day firm to another in order to create the ultimate bona fide purchaser, who would not be able to claim this 
property. On the other hand, in the above norm it is not a matter of property obtained as a result of a crime, but 
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of the property of the offender, at the expense of which it is planned to cover expenses for its obligations arising 
from the commission of a crime, such as a fine or compensation for a civil claim. 
Since in the course of asset grabbing of legal entities, sometimes such an approach is used as initiating 
criminal prosecution against the management of a victim firm, it seems useful to study foreign experience of 
criminal legal counteraction to these phenomena. 
Thus, §344 of the German Criminal Code contains the norm according to which the person shall be liable 
to prosecution if being an official this person was appointed to participate in the criminal process, except for the 
proceedings in imposition of punitive measures not related to deprivation of liberty, deliberately or knowingly 
prosecutes the innocent or another person who in general, according to the law, cannot be subjected to criminal 
prosecution, or influences the conduct of such a prosecution (CCG 2001). 
While studying the US criminal legislation, the author drew attention to such an institution of criminal law 
as ‘burglary’. According to article 221.1 of the Model Penal Code of the United States, ‘a person is guilty of 
burglary if he enters a building or a occupied structure or a separately secured or occupied portion thereof, with 
purpose to commit a crime therein, unless the premises are at the time open to the public or the actor is licensed 
or privileged to enter’ (Pashkov’s Library 2012). It should be noted that this institution was very dynamically 
changed in the Anglo-Saxon system (Golovanova et al. 2013), and the norms concerning it are not the same the 
criminal legislation of different states (Kozochkin 2007). 
A similar rule is contained in Article 245 of the Spanish Criminal Code, which establishes liability for a 
person who will occupy, without proper authorization, immovable property, another person’s house or a building 
that is not a dwelling, or will be located in it against the will of the owner (CCS 2013). 
It seems that the main idea of this institution, namely the inviolability of other people’s real estate, can be 
used to create a criminal legal mechanism to counter asset grabbing, committed in the form of forceful seizure of 
a legal entity. 
It is worth noting separately that the legislation of European countries establishes criminal liability for 
violation of the mode of treating the confidential information of companies (Stavilo 2010). These measures also 
seem to contribute to increasing protection against illegal takeover of a legal entity. 
The phenomenon of criminal asset grabbing is absent in such world powers as the United States of 
America, Great Britain, etc. As a general rule, in these countries such conflicts are recognized as a normal 
institution for the development of corporate relations and are called ‘unfriendly (hostile) takeover’. 
At the same time, it should be noted that criminal asset-grabbing has its counterparts in the countries of 
the post-Soviet space. Ukraine and Belarus are bright representatives of countries that have recently been 
actively counteracting to this dangerous behavior. 
In Ukraine criminal and legal antitakeover measures resemble the levers that are present in the criminal 
law of Russia; however, in Ukraine the criminalization of such acts occurred much earlier. Thus, in 2008, Law No. 
801-VI of December 25, 2008 introduced two completely new articles in the Criminal Code of Ukraine: 223-1 
‘Forging documents that are filed for registration of the securities issue’ and 223-2 ‘Violation of the procedure for 
keeping the register of registered securities holders.’ As it was noted above, asset-grabbing in Ukraine is quite 
similar to asset-grabbing in Russia by its nature and set of actions. In this regard, quite often, the ‘classical’ 
hostile takeover ‘in the Ukrainian manner’ begins with the falsification of share registers. Such legislative 
innovations, adopted in 2008, allowed Ukrainian lawmakers to sue the perpetrators of illegal takeovers in the 
early stages of criminal asset grabbing. It is quite obvious that Russia’s response to the fight against criminal 
asset-grabbing in this direction was made only a year later, with the adoption of Federal Law No. 241-FZ of 
October 30, 2009, which introduced Article 185 ‘Violation of the procedure for recording rights to securities’ into 
the RF Criminal Code. And also two years later Federal Law No. 147-FZ of July 1, 2010 was adopted, which 
introduced article 1701 ‘Falsification of the Unified State Register of Legal Entities, the Register of Securities 
Holders and the Depository Accounting System’.  
Around the same time, Belarus adopted Law No. 146-3 of July 1, 2010 ‘On introduction of amendments 
and supplements to certain codes of Belarus regarding protection of information recorded in the register of 
securities holders’, according to which the Criminal Code of Belarus was supplemented with article 2261 ‘Illegal 
use or disclosure of information entered in the register of securities holders or information on the results of 
financial and economic activities of the securities issuer.’  
It is quite obvious that this criminal offense is noticeably narrower than similar crimes, the responsibility for 
which is provided for in the criminal laws of Ukraine and Russia, since such an act as the provision of data for 
entry into the register of securities holders remained beyond the scope of criminalization. The purpose of 
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adopting such a rule is identical to the Russian and Ukrainian ones – the suppression of criminal asset grabbing 
already at the first stages of the development of criminal activity. 
Conclusion 
The foregoing enables to draw the following conclusions: 
In the course of the research, legal acts of such states as the USA, the United Kingdom, China, the 
Netherlands, Sweden, Belarus, and Ukraine were studied. The authors concluded that there is a significant 
discrepancy between legislation aimed at protecting the interests of shareholders in the countries with developed 
market economies and in the CIS countries: 
(1) A two-tier regulatory system has been established in the member states of the European Union: all 
merger and acquisition transactions are considered by a special Merger Regulation Commission, 
along with local antimonopoly bodies, within the European Union. 
(2) The merger and acquisition scene in foreign countries was formed and began to function much 
earlier than in Ukraine; in this regard, the level of legislative regulation of these processes seems to 
be more optimal, protecting the interests of all parties to the transaction, the mechanism for their 
implementation is extremely detailed, which in fact excludes violation of the law. 
(3) The processes of companies’ mergers and acquisitions are controlled by state structures specially 
created to regulate the activity of participants in the stock market. 
(4) As such, the concept of ‘asset-grabbing’ is absent in the countries with a developed market 
mechanism. Actions similar to the classical manifestations of Ukrainian illegal takeover are 
considered as various variants of fraudulent behavior, associated with deception, forgery, 
counterfeit, illegal concealment of information, use of official position, banks, and state 
telecommunications systems.  
(5) Criminal asset-grabbing, known in Ukraine, has its analogies mainly in the countries of the post-
Soviet space. Criminal and legal tools for combating criminal asset-grabbing in Ukraine and in 
Belarus resemble the levers contained in the criminal law of Russia; however, the criminalization of 
such acts in Ukraine occurred much earlier. 
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